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How Roe v. Wade Was Written
David J. Garrow*
Let me begin with one sentence that Justice Harry A.
Blackmun uttered in 1987: “Roe against Wade1 was not such a
revolutionary opinion at the time” that it was handed down in
January 1973,2 and in that statement Justice Blackmun was
indisputably correct.
In the beginning, of course, there was Griswold v.
Connecticut3 in 1965, and it is always essential to remind people
that Griswold was not a “test case,” as Judge Robert H. Bork
labeled it during his 1987 testimony to the Judiciary Committee
of the United States Senate following his nomination to the High
Court,4 but that Griswold was in fact, as any competent student
of constitutional law should know, an appeal of two trial court
criminal convictions, of Estelle Griswold, the executive director of
Connecticut Planned Parenthood, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton,
chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Yale
University’s Medical School and a volunteer physician for
Planned Parenthood.5
Griswold and Buxton had been convicted of aiding and
abetting married female patients of Planned Parenthood’s New
Haven clinic in their use of contraceptive devices for the purpose

* Research Professor of History & Law, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law. I would like to thank my assistant Patty Blake for her help in preparing
this manuscript, which builds off of remarks delivered at Stanford
Constitutional Law Center’s Symposium on “Roe at 40” on March 7, 2013, as
well as at Washington & Lee University School of Law’s similarly titled
Symposium on November 7, 2013.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Bill Moyers: In Search of the Constitution: Mr. Justice Blackmun (PBS
television broadcast Apr. 26, 1987) (interviewing Justice Blackmun).
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 116 (1987).
5. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
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of preventing conception.6 Their bench trial convictions had been
affirmed first by a unanimous intermediate state appellate court7
and then by a unanimous Connecticut Supreme Court.8 Thus
what confronted the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in
December 1964 when they unanimously agreed to hear the
Griswold appeal9 was a constitutional challenge to a longstanding state statute criminalizing the use of contraceptive
articles,10 a statute which twice before had been brought before
the High Court without resulting in a decision on the merits.11
Griswold was before the High Court in the October Term of
1964 not just because Tileston v. Ullman12 had been ineptly
litigated by “white shoe” counsel whose imprecise complaint
doomed their case,13 or because the Warren Court itself, and
especially Justice William J. Brennan Jr., just four years earlier
had refused to find any true case and controversy in Poe v.
Ullman,14 but far more fundamentally because for over forty
years Roman Catholic political influence in Connecticut had
blocked any legislative repeal of the law criminalizing any use of
contraception, which part-time legislator and circus impresario
6. Id.; see also DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 203–13 (rev. ed.
1998) (providing additional details on the factual lead-up to Griswold).
7. See State v. Griswold, 200 A.2d 479, 480 (Conn. 1964) (detailing the
procedural history of the case).
8. Id. at 479.
9. Supreme Court Docket Sheet, Justice Tom C. Clark Papers, Box C81
(1964) (on file with University of Texas Law Library); Supreme Court Docket
Sheet (1964) (on file with Library of Congress, Warren Box 379); see also
GARROW, supra note 6, at 229 (citing to the docket sheet).
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-196 (repealed 1969).
11. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (dismissing the declaratory
judgment claims for failure to allege a case or controversy); Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (dismissing a physician’s appeal from a denial of
declaratory judgment for lack of standing).
12. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
13. See id. at 46 (dismissing the physician’s appeal because he asserted a
denial of only his patients’ constitutional rights, not his own); see also GARROW,
supra note 6, at 94–95, 102–05 (explaining how the appeal cited only a
deprivation of “life” under the Fourteenth Amendment, which Tileston lacked
standing to raise).
14. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (concluding that there was
no Article III case or controversy after evaluating the “appropriateness of the
issues for decision by this Court and the actual hardship to the litigants of
denying them the relief sought”).
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P.T. Barnum had brought to enactment in 1879.15 Ironically,
Griswold created constitutional protection for reproductive
choices only because Roman Catholic political actors had
prevented any legislative resolution of a controversy that had
appeared before Connecticut’s state legislature every two years,
without exception, from 1923 through 1963.16
Once Griswold bestowed constitutional protection upon a
right to privacy regarding contraceptive use, the doctrinal door
was thereby opened for young academics and litigators who
would take that initially modest doctrinal innovation and expand
it beyond application to simply contraceptive choice. The most
important and most remarkable aspect of the story of the creation
of the very idea of a right to abortion is how something that
almost literally had never, prior to 1963, ever been publicly
suggested by anyone anywhere in America,17 then, after
Griswold, developed and spread so rapidly that by late 1969 and
early 1970 multiple such federal constitutional claims were being
filed independently of each other in district courts across the
country.18
Across the years 1967, 1968, and 1969, a nationwide set of
young lawyers became convinced that Griswold’s constitutional
privacy analysis, whether best captured by Justice William O.
Douglas’s penumbras and emanations majority opinion,19 Justice
15. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 15–16 (providing a detailed history of the
enactment and attempted repeal of Connecticut’s 1879 contraception
prohibition).
16. See id. at 15–217 passim (describing the history of the Connecticut
contraception prohibition).
17. See id. at 272–74 (reviewing the early history of public support for the
legalization of abortion to conclude that, with few exceptions, “open discussion of
whether abortion should to some greater degree be legalized simply did not take
place”); see also id. at 293 (attributing the first public argument for an
unconditioned right to obtain an abortion to University of California at Santa
Barbara biologist Garrett Hardin in October 1963).
18. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 742–43 (N.D. Ohio
1970) (noting that this constitutional challenge to an Ohio abortion law under
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments was
“another in a series of cases which have been and are being filed in various
courts throughout the United States attacking the constitutionality of state
statutes forbidding abortions”).
19. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing
cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
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Arthur Goldberg’s invocation of the long-ignored Ninth
Amendment,20 or Justice John M. Harlan’s unapologetic embrace
of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process liberty,21
should protect a woman’s desire to abort a pregnancy as well as
for marital contraception. As of 1966 and 1967, almost the entire
population of activists and legislators who were working to
liberalize the criminal statutes that disallowed almost any legal
abortion in every single state had as their state-by-state goals the
passage of reform legislation that would allow some individual
women with specific medical reasons for wanting an abortion to
apply and win approval from some hospital-based committee of
doctors.22
This push for what was called “abortion law reform”
registered its first surprising successes in Colorado, North
Carolina, and then California in the spring of 1967,23 but within
hardly twelve months’ time the realization began to dawn on
almost all of those reform proponents that the number of
pregnant women wanting abortions who actually qualified for
them under these new statutes was exceedingly modest, and that
the vast majority of women hoping to end pregnancies did not
have particular therapeutic or health reasons for doing so.24
Thus, with a speed that in retrospect is incredibly striking,
virtually the entire community of therapeutic reform advocates
substance.”).
20. See id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“In sum, I believe that the
right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic—a personal
right ‘retained by the people’ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.”).
21. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, the
proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute
infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”).
22. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 304–34 (describing public abortion
activism from 1966 to 1967, which “remained fairly within a legislative context
and reflected largely a reform orientation”).
23. See id. at 323–25, 327–32 (describing early abortion reform bills passed
in Colorado, North Carolina, and California, which allowed abortion under a
limited set of circumstances).
24. See, e.g., The Desperate Dilemma of Abortion, TIME, Oct. 13, 1967, at 33
(“The key question is whether limited legislation is any solution. In fact, the new
laws merely codify what hospitals are already doing.”); see also GARROW, supra
note 6, at 341–42, 351, 360, 374–76 (providing examples of public discontent
with the modest impact of legislative reform).
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shifted to support of abortion law repeal, that is the legalization
of abortion irrespective of the reasons why a pregnant woman
wanted to obtain one.25 Rather than viewing abortion from a
fundamentally medical perspective, where women had to invoke
some health rationale and then win multiple doctors’ blessings in
order to get an abortion, now the proponents of change were
acknowledging that what was fundamentally at issue was
women’s claim that the abortion decision should be their own,
and not the product of a medical authorization process.26
This evolution brought the proponents of state-by-state
legislative change to the same stance and worldview that a few
young lawyers had begun striving to articulate in constitutional
rights terms from 1967–68 onward. The most important, original,
and influential of these lawyers was Roy Lucas, who graduated
from NYU Law School in 1967 and spent the ensuing academic
year teaching at the University of Alabama Law School before
returning to New York in the summer of 1968,27 just as the North
Carolina Law Review was publishing his seminal article detailing
how state anti-abortion laws were highly susceptible to
constitutional attack in federal court lawsuits based upon
Griswold’s precedent.28
Lucas and other strategists spent the latter half of 1968 and
the first nine months of 1969 slowly preparing to file the very
first such test case, and on the last day of September Hall v.
Lefkowitz29—the named defendant being New York State’s
25. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 335–88 (providing a comprehensive
history of the shift from activism aimed at legislative reform to abortion
prohibition repeal).
26. See id. at 376 (documenting the emergence of public recognition of a
woman’s right to abortion).
27. See id. at 335–39 (describing the origin of Roy Lucas’s interest in
advocating for a right to obtain an abortion and the initial impact of his
academic work); Ian Urbina, Roy Lucas, 61, Legal Theorist Who Helped Shape
Roe Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at C10 (recounting Lucas’s life and role in
developing the right to obtain an abortion).
28. See Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement
and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730, 731 (1968)
(“This article, however, examines the possibility of federal constitutional bases
for invalidating state abortion restrictions.”).
29. 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The case was consolidated with
three other cases and referred to a three-judge panel in Hall v. Lefkowitz. Id. at
1031.
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Attorney General—was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.30 Dr. Robert E. Hall and the other
three named plaintiffs were all extremely prominent obstetriciangynecologists with medical school professorships, and throughout
the loosely coordinated network of attorneys interested in
constitutional challenges to state abortion statutes, the belief was
that there were no possible plaintiffs who could more impress
federal judges than high-status doctors.31 Lucas intended for
similar if not identical federal cases to be filed in other states,
including Texas, where his intended lead plaintiff was prominent
Fort Worth obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr. Hugh W. Savage,32 but
come the spring of 1970 Lucas’s carefully laid plans were
upended on multiple fronts by unexpected events.
In early March, a young lawyer in Dallas, Linda Coffee, who
had been in repeated contact with abortion repeal supporters
both there and in Austin, but not with Lucas or any other out-ofstate attorneys, filed a pseudonymous abortion rights case in
federal court there against the local district attorney33: Roe v.
Wade.34 Far more importantly, certainly in the eyes of
contemporary observers, on April 9 the New York State
Assembly, with no votes to spare, passed a bill legalizing abortion
until the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.35 The far-off state of
Hawaii had surprisingly passed a repeal bill, but including a
residency requirement, weeks earlier,36 yet the New York law,
scheduled to take effect on July 1, included no such restriction,
30. Id. at 1030–31 (listing defendants).
31. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 378–80 (describing the strategic choice of
plaintiff, forum, and timing in Lucas’s New York challenge).
32. See id. at 381, 383–88 (describing potential lawsuits to challenge
abortion laws in Texas, Colorado, North Carolina, Washington, and Iowa).
33. See id. at 389–407 (describing the factual circumstance that led to
Linda Coffee’s involvement in and filing of Roe and Doe in federal court in
Texas).
34. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
35. Act of Apr. 11, 1970, ch. 127, 1970 N.Y. Laws 852 (codified as amended
at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 2013)); see also GARROW, supra note 6,
at 421–22 (describing the dramatic passage of New York’s repeal bill in the state
assembly).
36. Act of Mar. 11, 1970, ch. 1, sec. 2, 1970 Haw. Sess. Laws 1 (codified as
amended at HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (West 2013)); see also GARROW, supra note
6, at 412–14 (describing the impetus for and passage of Hawaii’s repeal bill).
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thus soon making a legal abortion available to any woman with
the wherewithal to travel to New York.37 But a major casualty of
that landmark new statute was Lucas’s carefully designed initial
test case, which was mooted by the legislature’s action,38 and two
major byproducts ensued once the New York statute did take
effect in mid-summer. One, among proponents, was a major,
economy-minded push to launch specialized clinics where
abortions could be performed at vastly lower cost than what
hospitals would charge;39 the second, among opponents, was the
belated realization that far more energetic political activity would
be necessary on behalf of the right-to-life cause if the emerging
trend toward abortion law repeal was to be staunched or pushed
37. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 421 (“Repeal proponents . . . quickly
began to warn that New York, and especially New York City, might be all but
inundated by a nationwide flood of women seeking to terminate unwanted
pregnancies . . . .”).
38. Id. at 421. Although Lucas and others had no way of knowing so at the
time, in historical retrospect the derailing of Hall as the first federal court case
testing his constitutional argument was actually a positive development. See A.
Raymond Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion
Opinion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1038–42 (2006) (concluding from his
draft opinion that Judge Friendly would not have found New York’s abortion
laws unconstitutional).
39. This choice would have enormous and, at the time, largely
unappreciated consequences for the provision of abortion services across all
future decades: the concentration of abortion performance in “free-standing”
clinics, unattached to any hospitals or comprehensive care networks, would in
future years isolate many abortion providers from the wider medical profession
and render them oftentimes lonely and sometimes besieged figures. See
GARROW, supra note 6, at 456–57 (describing the risks of “free-standing”
abortion clinics). In 1970, only Dr. Robert E. Hall had the foresight and
perspicacity to warn how momentous these consequences would be. See id. at
456–57, 483 (summarizing some of Hall’s public arguments for performing
abortions in hospitals); David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade:
An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 839 (1999) [hereinafter Garrow,
Abortion Before and After] (“Hall argued, pro-choice forces were in essence
declaring that organized medicine, which had become an important participant
in abortion liberalization efforts, no longer had to hold itself responsible for
helping to provide actual abortion services.”); Symposium, Pregnancy
Termination: The Impact of New Laws, 6 J. REPROD. MED. 274, 293–94 (1971)
(recording Dr. Hall’s argument that abortions should be performed in hospitals
to avoid substandard procedures); Robert E. Hall, Realities of Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1971, at 27 (arguing the safety and health advantages of
requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals); LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND
UNABLE: DOCTORS’ CONSTRAINTS IN ABORTION CARE vii (2010) (noting how
“abortion care is marginalized in American medicine”).
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back.40 New York’s enactment of repeal was far and away the
single most important pre-1973 abortion-related event because it
was New York’s legalization that spurred the mobilization of
anti-abortion activism well prior to January of 1973.41 Come
November 1970, Washington State by popular vote became the
fourth state to legalize abortion,42 but from that point in time
onward, across all of calendar 1971 and all of calendar 1972, antiabortion forces, rather than pro-repeal forces, were consistently
in the political driver’s seat as the blowback against New York’s
legalization generated a nationwide anti-abortion political
upsurge.43 Once anyone immerses themselves in the
contemporary political record of that 1971–1972 time period, one
inescapably sees the political landscape turning very much
against abortion legalization, notwithstanding how Roy Lucas
and several dozen other generally young attorneys, sometimes
coordinated and sometimes not, were filing more than two dozen
state-by-state constitutional challenges to existing anti-abortion
statutes.44
The first abortion case to come before the U.S. Supreme
Court was United States v. Vuitch,45 in which the justices heard
two full hours of argument in January 1971.46 Vuitch had seen a
40. See Garrow, Abortion Before and After, supra note 39, at 840–41
(arguing that state legislative repeal efforts, not the breadth of Roe v. Wade,
initially motivated mobilization of right to life activists). Effective July 29,
Alaska became the third state to legalize abortion. GARROW, supra note 6, at
431–32.
41. See Garrow, Abortion Before and After, supra note 39, at 840 (“[Before
Roe and Doe] the most important development which took place subsequent to
the New York victory was the mobilization of a significant right to life
movement.”).
42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.060–.090 (repealed 1991); see also
GARROW, supra note 6, at 466 (describing Washington’s popular vote legalization
of abortion as “perhaps [national activists’] most politically important victory so
far”).
43. See Garrow, Abortion Before and After, supra note 39, at 841 (“Thus, by
November 1972 . . . prospects for making any sort of non-judicial headway with
abortion law liberalization looked very bleak indeed.”).
44. See id. (“During 1971 and 1972, pro-choice forces won no political
victories, and New York activists were worried as to whether they could
continue to protect their statute from legislative repeal after Nelson Rockefeller
left the governorship.”).
45. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
46. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 473–80 (providing a history of Vuitch).
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prominent federal district judge dismiss a criminal prosecution of
a doctor who performed abortions under the District of
Columbia’s unusually liberal anti-abortion law, which authorized
abortions necessary to preserve a woman’s health, on the grounds
that that “health” standard was unconstitutionally vague.47 After
extended internal discussion, the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s vagueness ruling, but in so doing declared that the
statute’s promulgation of a “health” exception was not
unconstitutionally vague so long as “health” was correctly
understood to cover a pregnant woman’s “psychological as well as
physical well-being.”48 Repeal proponents quickly appreciated
that that holding was actually a significant victory, rather than a
defeat,49 and several weeks after handing down Vuitch the
Supreme Court agreed to hear two of several other abortion cases
in which it had been deferring any action until Vuitch was
decided.50
One case in which the High Court already had declined to
intervene was Minnesota’s highly publicized criminal prosecution
of a well-regarded St. Paul physician, Dr. Jane Hodgson, who in
April 1970, with the support of other prominent local M.D.’s, had
initiated a federal court suit seeking both declaratory and
injunctive relief so that she could perform a hospital abortion on
a young married patient, Nancy K. Widmyer, whose nine-weekold fetus had indisputably been exposed to rubella virus.51 The
federal district judge before whom the matter came refused to
issue any immediate order, and nine days later Dr. Hodgson
performed the abortion.52 Three weeks later Hodgson was
47. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969).
48. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72–73.
49. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 490–91 (“Indeed, it quite rapidly became
clear that the decision would significantly increase rather than decrease
abortion availability in the nation’s capital.”).
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (striking parts of the Texas
abortion statute as unconstitutional); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973)
(finding aspects of Georgia’s abortion statute “violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 480, 491 (describing the
Justices’ decisions to delay consideration of these cases until after Vuitch was
decided).
51. Marcia D. Greenberger & Rachel K. Laser, Human Rights Hero: Jane
Hodgson, M.D., 30 HUM. RTS. 2, Spring 2003, at 24, 24.
52. Id.
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criminally indicted by the local district attorney, and both before,
and again after those charges were filed, the federal court
insisted that no “case or controversy” existed and refused to
intervene.53
Dr. Hodgson went to trial in November 1970, after both the
Minnesota Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court declined
to halt her prosecution.54 Hodgson had retained Roy Lucas to aid
in her defense, but with both the attorney and the defendant
hoping for a conviction rather than an acquittal, so that her case
could proceed forward with the best possible set of facts for
challenging anti-abortion laws, Dr. Hodgson’s non-jury trial
featured Mrs. Widmyer and a Mayo Clinic physician as the
primary defense witnesses.55 The trial judge indeed found
Hodgson guilty, and while briefing in her appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court would not be complete until the summer of 1971,
at least the two Minnesota natives on the U.S. Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and junior Associate Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, who once had worked at the Mayo Clinic and
was well-acquainted with Hodgson’s top medical supporter, Dr.
Joseph H. Pratt,56 both indicated during the Court’s consideration
of Vuitch that they knew very well that Hodgson’s criminal
appeal was headed their way.57
The two cases that the High Court in early May 1971 did,
soon after Vuitch, agree to hear, Roe v. Wade from Texas and Doe
v. Bolton58 from Georgia, had both been filed in early 1970 and
had then come before special three-judge district courts from
53. Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32, 35–36 (D. Minn. 1970); see also
GARROW, supra note 6, at 428–30 (providing a history of Hodgson’s involvement
in the abortion reform movement and Randall).
54. GARROW, supra note 6, at 466–67.
55. See id. at 467–68 (describing that the case “‘could not be better,’ as it
posed abortion’s constitutional issues in the most compelling context”).
56. See id. at 474 (“A few abortion litigators had heard talk that Blackmun
was a good friend of Mayo’s Dr. Joseph H. Pratt, Jane Hodgson’s most
prominent Minnesota medical supporter, and even that Pratt had been Mrs.
Blackmun’s doctor . . . .”).
57. For Justice Blackmun’s references to Randall, see Oral Argument at
54:44, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (No. 84), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_84#argument. For discussion of
Chief Justice Burger’s anticipation of Randall, see GARROW, supra note 6, at
479.
58. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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which direct appeal to the Supreme Court was possible following
the panels’ denials of injunctive relief.59 Both panels had
nonetheless ruled against the existing Texas and Georgia
abortion statutes,60 and with a plethora of other abortion cases
already docketed before the High Court—including ones from
Louisiana, Missouri, and Illinois61—and others, like Jane
Hodgson’s, known to be looming, it was unsurprising that five
Justices—Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, White, and Marshall—
voted to accept both Roe and Doe for argument on the merits
come October Term 1971.62
It is often asserted, most notably by someone who is now
herself a Supreme Court Justice, that the Justices should—and
could—have avoided or at least postponed any consideration of
Roe and Doe’s constitutional merits in 1971–72.63 That assertion
is often interwoven with the claim that such a delay would have
allowed proliberalization forces to continue making progress
politically state-by-state,64 but, following Washington State’s
adoption of its repeal law thanks to a popular referendum vote in
November 1970,65 in no state whatsoever were any additional
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120–22 (1973); Doe, 410 U.S. at 185–87.
60. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Doe v. Bolton
319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
61. See Rosen v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 412 U.S. 902, 902 (1973)
(vacating judgment and remanding “for further consideration in light of” the Roe
and Doe decisions); Rodgers v. Danforth, 410 U.S. 949, 949 (1973) (same);
Hanrahan v. Doe, 410 U.S. 950, 950 (1973) (same).
62. GARROW, supra note 6, at 491.
63. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385–86 (1985) (“The political
process was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly enough for advocates of
quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting.
Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have
provoked, not resolved, conflict.”).
64. See id. at 380–82 (arguing that the breadth of Roe provoked legislative
backlash reversing a trend toward liberalization); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1992) (“In 1973,
when Roe issued, abortion law was in a state of change across the nation. As the
Supreme Court itself noted, there was a marked trend in state legislatures
‘toward liberalization of abortion statutes.’”). But see David Garrow, History
Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton’s Supreme Court Nominee Doesn’t Know
About Roe, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C3 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg
misconstrued the political landscape prior to Roe); Garrow, Abortion Before and
After, supra note 39, at 837, 840–41 (same).
65. GARROW, supra note 6, at 465–66.
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repeal measures enacted during 1971 or 197266 and only Florida
managed to approve even a reform bill.67 What’s more, in New
York State, come May 1972, the state legislature voted to repeal
the 1970 legalization statute, and only Governor Nelson
Rockefeller’s veto kept the 1970 law in place.68 Later that year,
efforts to duplicate Washington State’s 1970 popular vote success
went down to overwhelming defeats in both Michigan and North
Dakota.69
Four months after the Court announced that it would hear
Roe and Doe, a six-day period in September 1971 witnessed the
back-to-back resignations of aging Justices Hugo L. Black and
John M. Harlan, suddenly reducing the Court to a seven- rather
than nine-member bench.70 By early December neither of their
successors, Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist, had yet
been seated, and without dissent the remaining justices denied
Texas’s request to postpone oral argument until a full Court was
available and proceeded to hear argument in Roe and Doe on
December 7.71
The Justices’ private, post-argument conference discussion of
the two cases revealed that a clear majority favored affirmance of
the lower court’s ruling in Roe, but no consensus whatsoever
about how to resolve Doe,72 and Chief Justice Burger assigned
responsibility for preparing opinions in both cases to the Court’s
junior Justice, Harry A. Blackmun.73 Notwithstanding that
assignment, both Justices William O. Douglas and William J.
Brennan privately prepared, and shared with each other, initial
66. Id. at 483–85, 495–96, 506–07.
67. Id. at 538–39.
68. Id. at 545–47.
69. Id. at 562–63, 576–77 (noting that despite favorable polling, the
Michigan referendum lost by a vote of 61 to 39 percent and the North Dakota
referendum lost by a vote of 77 to 23 percent).
70. Id. at 507.
71. Id. at 521–27.
72. See id. at 528–32 (tallying votes of 5–2 to affirm the lower court in Roe
but noting no consensus in Doe).
73. See id. at 533–34 (describing the circumstances of Justice Burger’s
assignment of the Roe and Doe opinions to Justice Blackmun); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 86 (1988)
(“Despite the fact that he was not part of the majority, the Chief Justice
assigned the opinions in the two abortion cases to Justice Blackmun.”).
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drafts of potential opinions in Doe, and both Justices’ writings,
just like the seven Justices’ conference discussion, left no doubt
whatsoever that a decision on the merits regarding the Griswoldbased challenge to the constitutionality of anti-abortion statutes
was going to occur in at least one of the two cases.74 Once Justices
Powell and Rehnquist were sworn in and seated in early 1972,
Blackmun himself nominated both Roe and Doe as candidates for
possible reargument before a full, nine-member Court, though
any decision on that question would await Blackmun’s own
drafting efforts.75
Only in mid-May 1972 did Blackmun finally circulate an
unusually brief, seventeen page draft of an opinion in Roe v.
Wade,76 and, to the disappointment and consternation of at least
four of his colleagues, it proposed that the Court hold Texas’s
anti-abortion law unconstitutional solely on the grounds that its
inclusion of only a maternal “life” exception was void for
vagueness.77 Justices Brennan and Douglas both voiced direct
complaints,78 and several days later Blackmun circulated a
significantly more substantive draft opinion for Doe v. Bolton.79
However, as the Justices proceeded to exchange views about that
draft, Justice Byron R. White circulated a brief, three-page draft
of a dissent from Blackmun’s proposed Roe opinion, cogently
highlighting how any holding that Texas’s statute was
unconstitutionally vague would necessarily override the Court’s
74. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 534–37 (recounting the dialogue between
Justices Douglas and Brennan regarding draft Doe opinions); SCHWARTZ, supra
note 73, at 93–102 (reprinting Justice Douglas’s first Doe draft).
75. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Chief Justice Burger (Jan. 18, 1972)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 249); see also GARROW, supra
note 6, at 537–38 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s letter).
76. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 103–19 (reprinting the first Roe draft).
77. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 547–48 (describing Blackmun’s Roe draft
as being of “disappointing quality” that “immediately generated a good deal of
additional woe in Douglas’s chambers as well as those of Justice Marshall,
Brennan, and Stewart”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 89–90 (labeling Justice
Blackmun’s vagueness analysis as “far from impressive”).
78. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 549–50 (quoting the Brennan and
Douglas memos).
79. See id. at 550–51 (describing Justice Blackmun’s Doe draft as “a
considerably more sophisticated and far-reaching piece of work than his Roe
circulation”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 120–40 (reprinting Justice
Blackmun’s first Doe draft).
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thirteen-month-old holding in Vuitch, for “[i]f a standard which
refers to the ‘health’ of the mother . . . is not impermissibly vague,
a statutory standard which focuses only on ‘saving the life’ of the
mother would appear to be a fortiori acceptable.”80
White’s action pushed Blackmun to return to the stance he
had suggested four months earlier, namely that both Roe and Doe
should be held over for reargument before all nine justices early
in the following term.81 Such a move, Blackmun said, would also
allow him, over the summer, to devote more study and work to
the two opinions,82 and despite vocal objections from Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, all of whom worried that
Blackmun might with time abandon their tentative majority’s
stance on the constitutional merits, both Justices Powell and
Rehnquist weighed in favoring reargument,83 and in late June
the Court so ordered, with only Douglas in public dissent.84
By late in the summer of 1972, Blackmun’s two departing
law clerks who had had responsibility for the Roe and Doe
opinions, John T. Rich and George Frampton, were still strongly
inclined to leave Roe as a void for vagueness holding and make
Doe the more constitutionally significant decision.85 Frampton
80. Draft Circulation in Roe from Justice White to the Justices of the
Supreme Court (May 26, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan
Box 282); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 552 (quoting Justice White’s draft
Doe dissent); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 141–43 (reprinting the draft
circulation).
81. See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Blackmun to the
Justices of the Supreme Court (May 31, 1972) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Brennan Box 282) (“Although it would prove costly to me personally,
in the light of energy and hours expended, I have now concluded, somewhat
reluctantly, that reargument in both cases at an early date in the next term,
would perhaps be advisable.”); GARROW, supra note 6, at 552–53 (quoting Justice
Blackmun’s memo).
82. See Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Blackmun to the
Justices of the Supreme Court (May 31, 1972) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Brennan Box 282) (citing uncertainty about the detailed structure the
abortion opinions should take as prompting Blackmun to “think about a
summer’s delay”); GARROW, supra note 6, at 552–53 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s
memo).
83. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 552–56 (documenting the intra-Court
dynamics regarding the possibility of reargument).
84. See Roe v. Wade, 408 U.S. 919, 919 (1972) (granting reargument).
85. David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May–June
2005, at 26, 29 [hereinafter Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun].
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told Blackmun the opinions should provide states with “a
comprehensive prescription” for how to revise their abortion
statutes, and he explained how in Doe
I have written in, essentially, a limitation of the [abortion]
right depending on the time during pregnancy when the
abortion is proposed to be performed . . . . I have chosen the
point of [fetal] viability for this ‘turning point’ (when state
interests become compelling) for several reasons: a) it seems to
be the line of most significance to the medical profession . . . ;
b) it has considerable analytic basis in terms of the state
interest as I have articulated it [regarding the fetus].86

Frampton also explained that “I have included a section
designed to show in greater detail that neither the law nor any
other discipline has really arrived at a consensus about the
beginning of life.”87 But Frampton apologized that with regard to
constitutional privacy analysis, “I would have liked to do more
here, but I really didn’t have time at the end” and that the
deficiency was regrettable: “Since the opinion does use this right
throughout, and since it is a new application of it, I think
considerable explanation is required in addition to what the
circulated draft contained—which was a little more than one
sentence plus a string cite in [the] text” that dated from three
months earlier.88
In the weeks immediately preceding Roe and Doe’s scheduled
rearguments on October 11, 1972, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.
gave Blackmun’s earlier drafts his first careful reading.89 Powell
had no doubt that Texas’s anti-abortion law was “unduly
restrictive of individual rights,” as he jotted in the margin of
Blackmun’s Roe draft, but he also endorsed Byron White’s
critique, noting “I agree that the Texas statute is not unconst.
vague.”90 At bottom, Powell wrote to himself, “Why not

86. Id. (quoting Letter from George T. Frampton to Justice Blackmun (Aug.
11, 1972) (on filed with the Library of Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 152)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, AM. LAW., May 2000,
at 80, 80 [hereinafter Garrow, Revelations].
90. Id. at 81–82.
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consolidate Texas + Ga. cases + rely on Ga. type analysis” to void
both states’ statutes on constitutional privacy grounds.91
Several days later, Powell mentioned to his law clerk
assigned to assist on Roe and Doe, Larry Hammond, that they
should pay heed to a majority opinion that a three-judge court
considering a challenge to Connecticut’s abortion statute had
issued just two weeks earlier, on September 20, 1972.92 In that
case, Abele v. Markle,93 District Judge Jon O. Newman, writing
for himself and Second Circuit Judge J. Edward Lumbard, had
observed that in the context of an unwanted pregnancy, “the right
to an abortion is of even greater concern to the woman than the
right to use a contraceptive protected in Griswold” and thus
voided the Connecticut law.94 Newman went on to say that “a
fetus is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment” and that “its capacity to become such a person does
not mean that during gestation it is such a person.”95
Hammond prepared a bench memo for Powell, reviewing
Blackmun’s earlier drafts, revisiting Griswold, and summarizing
Judge Newman’s analysis.96 Given Griswold, “it would not be
difficult for this Ct. to find a fundamental right of a woman to
control the decision whether to go through the experience of
pregnancy and assume the responsibilities that occur
thereafter.”97 Hammond recommended to Powell that “you might
reason as Judge Newman does that the state interest becomes
more dominant when the fetus is capable of independent
existence (or becomes ‘viable’).”98 Highlighting how Texas, like
Connecticut, was defending its statute by contending that fetuses
were constitutional “persons,” Hammond noted that “the crux of
Judge Newman’s analysis is that the state may not bar abortional
freedom altogether on the basis of a proposition that is subject to
such a great public debate and affects individuals so
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
Id. at 227, 232.
Id. at 228–29.
Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 82.
Id.
Id.
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personally.”99 Overall, Hammond observed, “I do believe that a
well-reasoned opinion can be written reaching this result without
placing the Ct. in the position of deciding as a super-legislature
whether it will permit abortions at any specific point in time.”100
During the two rearguments, Justice Potter Stewart readily
interjected Newman’s name when one of the counsel, after
mentioning the Connecticut decision, paused while trying to
name its author.101 When the justices met in conference two days
later, Stewart again referred by name to Newman before
Blackmun explained that he still would like to make Doe the lead
opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment privacy right issue and
strike Texas’s statute on vagueness grounds while nonetheless
leaving Vuitch undisturbed.102 But Lewis Powell, after indicating
a belief that health factors, rather than economic considerations,
ought to undergird abortion decisions, recommended, just as he
had concluded when he first read Blackmun’s drafts, that the
Texas statute too should be struck down on the basic
constitutional question and that Roe should be the lead
opinion.103 Powell’s statement led Blackmun to say that he would
be “willing to bypass vagueness” in Roe and decide both cases on
the same basic constitutional grounds.104 As the conference
ended, it was clear to all the Justices that there were certainly six
votes, and probably seven, depending upon Warren Burger, in
support of Blackmun and Powell’s stance, with only Byron White
and William Rehnquist in disagreement.105
Following that conference, five weeks passed before Harry
Blackmun circulated heavily revised opinions in both Roe and
Doe, and altered one very significant particular from where
George Frampton’s handiwork had left things three months

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Oral Reargument at 8:45, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_18/reargument.
102. GARROW, supra note 6, at 574–75.
103. Id. at 575–76.
104. Id. at 576 (quoting Justice Brennan’s Conference Notes and Vote
Tallies on Roe and Doe (Oct. 24, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Brennan Docket Books, Boxes 418, 419)).
105. Id. at 573–76; Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 82.
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earlier.106 In these revised drafts, as Blackmun told his colleagues
in a cover memo, “I have concluded that the end of the first
trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally
arbitrary.”107 In his Roe draft, Blackmun stated that during the
first trimester of pregnancy, a state “must do no more than to
leave the abortion decision to the best medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”108 However, “[f]or the
stage subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it
chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts legal
abortions to stated reasonable therapeutic categories that are
articulated with sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to
predict what conditions fall within the stated classifications.”109
In the immediate wake of those two circulations, several
extremely important developments rapidly took place. First off,
the responses from Blackmun’s colleagues were positive and
praiseful. William O. Douglas, previously the Justice most
worried about Blackmun’s approach to the cases, complimented
him on “an excellent job,”110 and Potter Stewart, who too had
been concerned, applauded “an admirably thorough job.”111
Perhaps most notably of all, even though Byron White and
William Rehnquist were in disagreement with Blackmun, their
comments on the opinions were gently, tentatively, and
respectfully—rather than forcefully or angrily—expressed.
106. GARROW, supra note 6, at 576, 580 (summarizing Justice Blackmun’s
draft opinions).
107. Cover Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to the Justices of the
Supreme Court (Nov. 22, 1972) (on file with Library of Congress, Blackmun Box
151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 580 (quoting the cover memo).
108. Draft Circulation in Roe #2 from Justice Blackmun to the Justices of
the Supreme Court (Nov. 21, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Brennan Box 281); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 580–81 (quoting the Roe
draft).
109. Draft Circulation in Roe #2 from Justice Blackmun to the Justices of
the Supreme Court (Nov. 21, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Brennan Box 281); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 581 (quoting the Roe draft);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 149 (same).
110. GARROW, supra note 6, at 581 (quoting Memorandum from Justice
Douglas to Justice Blackmun (Nov. 24, 1972) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Brennan Box 282)).
111. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Blackmun
(Nov. 27, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 282)).
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Almost immediately after reading the drafts, Rehnquist wrote
privately to Blackman to say that
although I am still in significant disagreement with parts of
them, I have to take my hat off to you for marshaling as well
as I think could be done the arguments on your side. I think I
will probably still file a dissent, although more limited than I
had contemplated after the conference discussion.112

White admitted that he had been “struggling with these cases”
and would “probably end up concurring in part and dissenting in
part,”113 which in turn led Rehnquist to add that “I am about
where Byron said he was” and would also “probably concur in
part and dissent in part.”114 In short, anyone anticipating,
particularly in light of White’s and Rehnquist’s subsequent
writings, both in Roe and Doe themselves and especially in
subsequent abortion cases in later years, that there had been
vigorous and vociferous objections within the Supreme Court
during late 1972 to Blackmun’s extension of Griswold-style
constitutional privacy analysis to the question of abortion would
be entirely mistaken.
Indeed, what substantive objections other Justices—and
clerks—did voice to Blackmun’s new drafts focused on the fact
that in their view Blackmun’s choice of the end of the first
trimester of pregnancy did not go far enough towards protecting a
woman’s opportunity to obtain an abortion.115 On November 27,
Lewis Powell’s clerk Larry Hammond gave the Justice a six-page
memo critiquing Blackmun’s drafts.116 Hammond was happy that
Blackmun “ha[d] embraced the straightforward constitutional
112. Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 82. In response to Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun privately reiterated that “I agree that after the
first trimester a state is entitled to more latitude procedurally as well as
substantively” in limiting women’s access to legal abortion. Id.
113. Letter from Justice White to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 1, 1972) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 282); see also GARROW, supra note 6,
at 581 (quoting Justice White’s letter).
114. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 4, 1972) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 282); see also GARROW, supra
note 6, at 581 (recounting the Justices’ reactions to the draft circulations).
115. See GARROW, supra note 6, at 581 (detailing the Justices’
correspondence regarding the point at which a state may appropriately regulate
abortion).
116. Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 82.
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view taken by Judge Newman in the Connecticut case,” but was
displeased by Blackmun’s focus on the end of the first
trimester.117 “It is unnecessary to the result that we draw the
line. If a line ultimately must be drawn, it seems that ‘viability’
provides a better point. This is where Judge Newman would have
drawn the line.”118
Powell marked up Hammond’s memo, writing “Unnecessary
to draw line—but may be desirable,” and noting a bold “yes” next
to another Hammond sentence: “Most people would probably
agree that the state has a much greater interest in protecting a
viable entity than it does at some earlier time.”119 Powell then
sent a private letter to Blackmun, saying that “I am enthusiastic
about your abortion opinions. They reflect impressive scholarship
and analysis,” but pointedly asking “whether you view your
choice of ‘the first trimester’ as essential to your decision.”120
Powell noted how Blackmun himself had termed that choice
“arbitrary,” and then voiced his overarching thought: “I have
wondered whether drawing the line at ‘viability’—if we conclude
to designate a particular point of time—would not be more
defensible in logic and biologically than perhaps any other single
time.” Powell then proceeded to quote some of Newman’s
Connecticut opinion language to Blackmun, observing that “I
rather agree with the view that the interest of the state is clearly
identifiable, in a manner which would be generally understood,
when the fetus becomes viable. At any point in time prior thereto,
it is more difficult to justify a cutoff date.”121
In Blackmun’s chambers, his new clerk handling Roe and
Doe, Randall Bezanson, offered Blackmun some detailed thoughts
about Powell’s comments:
Let’s assume that prior to the end of the first trimester no
limitations could be placed on abortion, as your opinion now
provides. And assume that after viability the state’s interest
becomes sufficiently compelling to prevent abortions except in
limited circumstances—preserving the life of the mother, or
her health as narrowly defined in a statute. I am still of the
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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opinion that during the ‘interim’ period between the end of the
first trimester and viability (about six months), the state
might impose some greater restrictions relating to medical
dangers posed by the operation, e.g., the operation would have
to be performed in a hospital, as opposed to a clinic close to a
hospital, and the like. One of the positive attributes of your
approach, as I see it, is that it leaves the state free to place
increasing restrictions on abortions over the period of
gestation if those restrictions are narrowly tailored to state
interests. Justice Powell’s suggestion seems to view the
relevant state interests too narrowly, and disregards the
state’s interest in assuring that the medical procedures
employed will be safe. Your opinion, as I view it, rests on two
state interest[s], which become compelling in varying degrees
over time, and not simultaneously: the state’s interest in
preserving the life of the fetus (here the most logical cutoff, as
Justice Powell suggests, is viability), and the state’s interests
in assuring that the abortion procedure is safe and adequately
protects the health of the patient (it is this interest to which I
think Justice Powell gives too little weight). The fetus is pretty
large at 4 or 5 or 6 months, although it may not be ‘viable.’ I
would imagine, and your opinion suggests to me, that the
medical risks which attend abortion of a fetus increase as the
size of the fetus increases. Thus the state’s interests may
increase vis-à-vis this factor before ‘viability.’
While the first trimester is, as you admit, an arbitrary
cutoff, I don’t think that it is all that arbitrary, and I would
not want to prejudge a state’s interests during the ‘interim’
period between the end of the first trimester and viability at
this time. I would stand by your original position, subject to
minor change, and leave the question of what legitimate
interests a state might have of requiring greater protection
through higher medical standards to another case.122

On December 4, 1972, Blackmun replied to Powell in a letter
that directly echoed Bezanson’s views of the choices they faced:
I have no particular commitment to the point marking the end
of the first trimester as contrasted with some other point, such
as quickening or viability. I selected the earliest of the three
because medical statistics and the statistical writings seemed
to focus on it and to draw their contrasts between the first
three months and the remainder of the pregnancy. In addition,
122. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 85, at 29–30
(quoting Memorandum from Randall P. Bezanson to Justice Blackmun (Nov. 29,
1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 151)).
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I thought it might be easier for some of the justices than a
designated later point. I could go along with viability if it could
command a court. By that time the state’s interest has grown
large indeed. I suspect that my preference, however, is to stay
with the end of the first trimester for the following reasons:
(1) It is more likely to command a court. (2) A state is still free
to make its decisions on the liberal side and fix a later point in
the abortion statutes it enacts. (3) I may be wrong, but I have
the impression that many physicians are concerned about
facilities and, for example, the need of hospitalization, after
the first trimester. I would like to leave the states free to draw
their own medical conclusions with respect to the period after
three months and until viability. The states’ judgments of the
health needs of the mother, I feel, ought, on balance, to be
honored.123

One week later, though, on December 11, Blackmun, without
citing Powell by name, sent all of the justices a two page memo
which in retrospect marks the fundamental turning point in
making the holdings in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton what they
in the end came to be:
One of the members of the Conference has asked whether my
choice of the end of the first trimester, as the point beyond
which a state may appropriately regulate abortion practices, is
critical. He asks whether the point of viability might not be a
better choice.
The inquiry is a valid one and deserves serious
consideration. I selected the earlier point because I felt that it
would be more easily accepted (by us as well as others) and
because most medical statistics and statistical studies appear
to me to be centered there. Viability, however, has its own
strong points. It has logical and biological justifications. There
is a practical aspect, too, for I am sure that there are many
pregnant women, particularly younger girls, who may refuse
to face the fact of pregnancy and who, for one reason or
another, do not get around to medical consultation until the
end of the first trimester is upon them, or, indeed, has passed.
I suspect that few could argue, or would argue, that a
state’s interest by the time of viability, when independent life
is presumably possible, is not sufficiently developed to justify
appropriate regulation. What we are talking about, therefore,
is the interval from approximately 12 weeks to about 28
weeks.
123.

Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 83.

HOW ROE V. WADE WAS WRITTEN

915

One argument for the earlier date is that the state may
well be concerned about facilities and such things as the need
of hospitalization from and after the first trimester. If the
point of viability is selected, a decision of this kind is
necessarily left to the attending physician.
I would be willing to recast the opinions at the later date,
but I do not wish to do so if it would alienate any Justice who
has expressed to me, either by writing or orally, that he is in
general agreement, on the merits, with the circulated
memorandum.
I might add that some of the district
been confronted with the abortion issue
general, but not specific, terms of viability.
Judge Newman’s observation in the last
decision.

courts that have
have spoken in
See, for example,
Abele v. Markle

May I have your reactions to this suggestion?124

The first Justice to respond, William O. Douglas, that very day,
told Blackmun “I favor the first trimester, rather than
viability,”125 but the following day Thurgood Marshall’s chambers
sent to Blackmun a vitally significant letter written by clerk
Mark Tushnet,126 with only a single unimportant alteration in its
text made by Marshall himself:
I am inclined to agree that drawing the line at viability
accommodates the interests at stake better than drawing it at
the end of the first trimester. Given the difficulties which
many women may have in believing that they are pregnant
and in deciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier date

124. Memorandum to the Conference Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice
Blackmun to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Dec. 11, 1972) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 582–
83 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s memo).
125. Letter from Justice Douglas to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 11, 1972) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 282); see also GARROW, supra note 6,
at 583 (quoting Justice Douglas’s letter).
126. On Tushnet’s important role in Roe, and his subsequent reflections on
that role, see Tushnet’s contribution in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID:
THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL
DECISION 86, 86–91 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID]; David J. Garrow, Roe v. Wade Revisited, 9 GREEN BAG 2D
71, 73–75 (2005); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 811–15, 820–21
(1983).
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may not in practice serve the interests of those women, which
your opinion does seek to serve.
At the same time, however, I share your concern for
recognizing the State’s interest in insuring that abortions be
done under safe conditions. If the opinion stated explicitly
that, between the end of the first trimester and viability, state
regulations directed at health and safety alone were
permissible, I believe that those concerns would be adequately
met.
It is implicit in your opinion that at some point the
State’s interest in preserving the potential life of the unborn
child overrides any individual interests of the women. I would
be disturbed if that point were set before viability, and I am
afraid that the opinion’s present focus on the end of the first
trimester would lead states to prohibit abortions completely at
any later date.
In short, I believe that, as the opinion now stands,
viability is a better accommodation of the interests involved,
but that the end of the first trimester would be acceptable if
additions along the lines I have suggested here were made.127

The following day, William Brennan sent Blackmun a
lengthier but very similar letter. Thanking Blackmun for “giving
second thoughts to the choice of the end of the first trimester as
the point beyond which a state may appropriately regulate
abortion practices,” Brennan nonetheless went on to say that “if
the ‘cut-off’ point is to be moved forward somewhat, I am not sure
that the point of ‘viability’ is the appropriate point,” since “if we
identify the state’s initial interests as the health of the woman
and the maintenance of medical standards,” viability “as the
point where a state may begin to regulate in consequence of these
interests seems to be technically inconsistent” since viability
concerned the fetus, not the woman.128 Fetal viability occurred
only “at a point in time after the state has asserted its interest in

127. Letter Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice Marshall to Justice
Blackmun (Dec. 12, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Marshall Box
99); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 583–84 (quoting Justice Marshall’s letter).
128. GARROW, supra note 6, at 584 (quoting Letter from Justice Brennan to
Justice Blackmun (Dec. 13, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan
Box 282)).
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safeguarding the health of the woman and in maintaining
medical standards.”129 Brennan went on to say that
I have no objection to moving the ‘cut-off’ point . . . from the
end of the first trimester . . . to a point more closely
approximating the point of viability (20 to 28 weeks), but I
think our designation of such a ‘cut-off’ point should be
articulated in such a way as to coincide with the reasons
for . . . creating such a ‘cut-off’ point.130

Warren Burger and Potter Stewart weighed in less pointedly
as well,131 while in Lewis Powell’s chambers Larry Hammond was
elated at Blackmun’s memo, telling Powell that Blackmun’s
acknowledgment that many young women might not appreciate
their predicament early in pregnancy was crucial.132 Powell
bracketed Hammond’s comments and wrote a bold “yes” by them
in the margin, and then drafted a letter of his own to Blackmun,
writing that “once we take the major step of affirming a woman’s
constitutional right, it seems to me that viability is a more logical
and defensible time for identifying the point at which the state’s
overriding right to protect potential life becomes evident.”133
Reprising Hammond’s points about young women in denial,
Powell added that “if there is a constitutional right to an
abortion, there is much to be said for making it effective where
and when it may well be needed most,” and he closed by again
mentioning how “favorably impressed” he was with Jon
Newman’s opinion that “identified viability as the critical time
from the viewpoint of the state.”134
Powell left his letter unsent, either because he expressed his
views to Blackmun in person, and/or because Marshall’s and
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 13, 1972)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Brennan Box 282); Letter from Justice
Stewart to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 14, 1972) (on file with Library of Congress,
Brennan Box 282); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585 (quoting Justice
Burger’s and Justice Stewart’s responses).
132. See Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 83 (quoting a memo from
clerk Larry Hammond to Justice Powell expressing Hammond’s elation at
Justice Blackmun’s recognition of the reality of young women’s difficulty in
obtaining an abortion in the first trimester).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Brennan’s successive letters had made much the same points,135
and in Blackmun’s chambers Randall Bezanson concluded that
revised opinions should
articulate the two state interests, and the point at which they
assume increasing significance. With respect to the state’s
interest in preserving the safety of the operation and the
conditions surrounding it, regulation might be permissible
somewhere between the end of the 1st trimester (if that is the
cut-off selected) and ‘viability’ or beyond. But with respect to
the state’s interest in preserving fetal life, the opinion might,
for example, indicate that only after “viability” does this
interest become sufficiently compelling to support regulation
in furtherance of this interest.136

On December 15, Blackmun himself wrote to all his
colleagues, thanking them for “the helpful suggestions” that had
been made over the previous four days and saying he would
revise his opinions in light of them.137 “I have in mind associating
the end of the first trimester with an emphasis on health, and
associating viability with an emphasis on the State’s interest in
potential life. The period between the two points would be treated
with flexibility.”138
Six days later, Blackmun circulated his all-but-final drafts of
both Roe and Doe, highlighting in a cover memo how in Roe “I
have tried to recognize the dual state interests of protecting the
mother’s health and of protecting potential life” and believed this
was “a better approach” than his previous drafts.139 Roe’s all-too135. Id.
136. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 85, at 30 (quoting
Memorandum from Randall P. Bezanson Regarding Mr. Justice Brennan’s
Letter on the Abortion Cases (Dec. 14, 1972) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 151)).
137. Memorandum to the Conference Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice
Blackmun to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Dec. 15, 1972) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585
(quoting Justice Blackmun’s memo).
138. Memorandum to the Conference Regarding Abortion Cases from Justice
Blackmun to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Dec. 15, 1972) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585
(quoting Justice Blackmun’s memo).
139. Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Blackmun to the Justices
of the Supreme Court (Dec. 21, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note 6, at 585–86 (quoting Justice
Blackmun’s memo).
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brief constitutional discussion had not been significantly beefed
up over the previous four months,140 but the opinion clearly
delineated the two distinct compelling state interests that the
Justices’ private exchanges had identified, holding that with
regard to maternal health, “the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of
present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the
first trimester.”141 Secondly, “[w]ith respect to the State’s
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother’s womb.”142 Blackmun observed that “[i]f the State is
interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far
as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is
necessary to protect the life or health of the mother,” and in
closing he emphasized that Roe’s holding “is consistent with the
relative weights of the respective interests involved” and “leaves
the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the
period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are
tailored to the recognized state interests.”143
Blackmun’s supportive colleagues quickly signed on, with
Potter Stewart remarking that he was “greatly impressed” with
the new drafts’ “thoroughness and care”144 and Lewis Powell
commending Blackmun for his “exceptional scholarship.”145 Thus
when Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton emerged to public view a few
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 153 (1973)
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the
Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy.
This was, of course, the crucial statement.
141. Id. at 163.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 163–65.
144. Letter from Justice Stewart to Justice Blackmun (Dec. 27, 1972) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note
6, at 586 (quoting Justice Stewart’s letter).
145. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Blackmun (Jan. 4, 1973) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Blackmun Box 151); see also GARROW, supra note
6, at 586 (quoting Justice Powell’s letter).
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weeks later on January 22, 1973, the two opinions articulated
radically different holdings than would have been the case eight
months earlier had Blackmun’s May 1972 drafts been handed
down instead. Griswold’s doctrinal “privacy” legacy, and the
young attorneys who had championed it, were by early 1972
historical “givens,” as was Dr. Jane Hodgson’s impending appeal
of her Minnesota criminal conviction, which was a direct echo of
how Griswold itself had finally forced the Court to address the
constitutionality of a state’s criminalization of the use of
contraceptives.146 But from there forward, the ironies of what had
transpired within the Supreme Court of the United States over
the course of those eight months abound, often starkly.
Had not Byron White, who in the end dissented far more
vociferously than he had ever indicated in conference or in his
comments to Blackmun,147 successfully derailed Blackmun’s
initial void for vagueness approach in Roe by pointing out the
fundamental contradiction between that view of “life” and what
the Court in Vuitch had held regarding “health,” Roe v. Wade at
age forty would be only somewhat more widely remembered than
Vuitch.
Three months later, in August 1972, just as he was leaving
his clerkship with Harry Blackmun, George Frampton full well
realized, and expressly pointed out, that due to his lack of time
the two draft opinions were badly deficient in their explication of
their constitutional “right to privacy” analysis and that
“considerable explanation is required” beyond what little the
drafts then contained,148 but notwithstanding all of the very
146. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–81 (1965) (challenging
Connecticut’s statute that made using contraceptives, or assisting another in
using them, illegal).
147. Complaining about how, prior to viability, the majority’s holding meant
that “the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or
caprice of the pregnant woman more than the life or potential life of the fetus,”
White declared that “I find nothing in the language or history of the
Constitution to support the Court’s judgments. The Court simply fashions and
announces a new constitutional right for pregnant women . . . with scarcely any
reason or authority for its action . . . .” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221–22 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting). Calling the rulings “an improvident and extravagant
exercise of the power of judicial review,” White decried how the Court was
barring “state efforts to protect human life” and giving “women and doctors . . .
the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it.” Id.
148. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, supra note 85, at 29.
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detailed exchanges amongst justices and clerks over the ensuing
four months about what the actual holdings should be, that
deficient constitutional explanation was never again addressed,
debated, or remedied.149
In sharp contrast, beginning with Lewis Powell, and then
including both his clerk, Larry Hammond, as well as Potter
Stewart, two of the most interested and influential Justices
focused upon District Judge Jon Newman’s brand new opinion in
Abele v. Markle and its discussion of fetal viability as best
illuminating the unclear path that lay before them. It was far
from unusual for the Justices to rely so heavily upon the
analytical approach of lower federal jurists; less than two years
earlier, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,150 a landmark ruling
that represented the Court’s first substantive interpretation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,151 Chief Justice Burger’s
ruling for a unanimous Court drew extensively and directly from
recent opinions authored by prominent Circuit Judges John D.
Butzner, John Minor Wisdom, and Simon E. Sobeloff.152
The impact of Newman’s opinion, particularly upon Powell,
went a long way towards explaining why fetal viability, rather
than the end of the first trimester, became the fundamental
constitutional “cut-off point” for abortion in the eyes of the U.S.
Supreme Court.153 Powell’s repeated recommendation of that shift
finally prevailed upon a clearly hesitant Harry Blackmun after
first Mark Tushnet, on behalf of Thurgood Marshall, and then
William Brennan, just like Randall Bezanson and George
149. See, most famously, John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973). “[Roe] is bad because it
is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives
almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.” Id.
150. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
151. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 251 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2012)). See also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26
(considering whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents employers from
imposing requirements that employees have a high school education or pass a
general intelligence test).
152. See David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke
Power Company, 67 VAND. L. REV. 197, 227–30 (2014) (outlining the opinion and
noting which lower court decisions were influential).
153. See Garrow, Revelations, supra note 89, at 83 (providing examples of
Justice Powell referencing Judge Newman’s opinion).
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Frampton before him within Blackmun’s own chambers, strongly
endorsed Powell’s view that Roe and Doe’s protection of a
woman’s largely unfettered right to choose abortion should be
extended from approximately twelve weeks of pregnancy to
twenty-four.
It is of course ironic that Harry Blackmun, who has gone
down in history first and overwhelmingly foremost as the author
of Roe v. Wade, privately opposed making the case’s holding
anywhere near as extensive as his final opinion actually came to
be. Less striking perhaps, but still notable, is the initially similar
opposition by the Court’s most notorious liberal, William O.
Douglas, and a strong and perhaps poignant counterfactual
argument can be made that an actual majority of the Roe Court,
if one further tallies the always-reluctant Warren Burger along
with the two actual dissenters, Byron White and William
Rehnquist, would have preferred a holding that reached only to
the end of the first trimester. But, instead, the more strongly
articulated preferences of Lewis Powell, William Brennan,
Thurgood Marshall’s chambers, and Potter Stewart decisively
prevailed as Blackmun, encouraged also by Randall Bezanson,
finally moved to accept Jon Newman’s emphasis upon the
decisiveness of fetal viability. That a supposedly conservative,
southern appointee of Republican President Richard M. Nixon, in
tandem with a Roman Catholic justice named to the Court by
Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and indirectly aided
months earlier by the dissenting Byron White, made Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton dramatically more far-reaching than they
would have been had Harry Blackmun adhered to the view of
pregnancy he brought to those repeated 1972 exchanges further
underscores how ironic indeed it is that Roe and Doe came to be
what they were on January 22, 1973.

***
In the spirit of this Symposium, three final points are in
order. First, nine years ago, Jack Balkin stated the fundamental
bottom-line of the constitutional principle concerning abortion as
accurately and succinctly as any federal jurist ever has:
“Individuals have the fundamental right to decide whether they
want to become parents” and “the state may not force people to
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become parents against their will.”154 Additionally, as Balkin
correctly framed it, “[w]here a woman’s life or health is not in
danger, the right to abortion is the right to a fair and realistic
opportunity to choose whether or not to become a mother.”155
Second, it is imperative, especially for those of us who
believe, as the controlling “trio” opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey156 rightly emphasized more
than twenty years ago,157 that Roe v. Wade stands in complete
partnership with Brown v. Board of Education158 as one of the
two greatest twentieth-century constitutional beacons of human
liberty and equality,159 and who also unapologetically embrace
that oftentimes in many women’s lives, to utilize the title of a
wonderful but little-remembered 1975 book, Abortion Is A
Blessing,160 to forthrightly acknowledge that there is a
fundamental difference between an eight- or ten-week abortion
and an eighteen- or twenty-week abortion. Late second trimester
abortion procedures161 are ethically as well aesthetically more
difficult than first trimester pregnancy terminations, just as
154. WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 126, at 40; see also
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 294
(2007) (“[A] woman’s right not to be forced by the state to become a mother and
thus to take on the responsibilities of parenthood.”).
155. WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 126, at 53; see also
Balkin, supra note 154, at 294–95 (explaining that this right requires “a
reasonable time to decide whether or not to become mothers and a fair and
realistic opportunity to make that choice”).
156. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
157. See id. at 867 (describing Brown and Roe as cases in which “the Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution”).
158. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
159. See Laura Kalman, On Roe at Forty, 41 REV. IN AM. HIST. 756, 756–57
(2013). As Kalman observes, “Roe is doing better than conventional wisdom
indicates.” Id. at 756.
160. ANNE NICOL GAYLOR, ABORTION IS A BLESSING (1975).
161. “Late” denotes sixteen weeks and after. Some deeply committed prochoice clinicians would choose fourteen weeks as a ceiling. See David J. Garrow,
From the Front Lines of the Abortion Wars, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 28,
2008, at 17, 17 (reviewing pro-choice abortion clinician Susan Wicklund’s book,
SUSAN WICKLUND, THIS COMMON SECRET: MY JOURNEY AS AN ABORTION DOCTOR
(2008), in which she explains her decision to perform abortions only prior to
fourteen weeks).
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Harry Blackman clearly acknowledged before the combined
efforts of Lewis Powell, William Brennan, and a handful of young
law clerks changed Roe and Doe into the opinions that we have
known since 1973. Fetal viability, as Casey, Stenberg,162 and even
Gonzales163 all acknowledge, should indeed remain the
fundamental constitutional threshold, but we who defend Roe and
champion Casey164 must not be shy in accepting open-minded
discussion of what sorts of therapeutic standards, depending
upon women’s individual circumstances, might properly govern
access to legal abortion once a pregnancy reaches sixteen weeks
or later.
But that discussion cannot take place absent two things: first
a universal acknowledgement that in every individual case, an
earlier abortion is ethically preferable to a later abortion, and
that statutes that have the effect of forcing women later into their
pregnancies before they are able to access a legal abortion are
thus a fortiori ethically repugnant; and second a universal
acknowledgement that anyone and everyone who professes to
want to reduce the incidence of abortion must publicly champion
the widest and freest possible availability of all forms of
contraception. Too oftentimes in debates over abortion, some
participants who focus upon the undeniable humanity of the fetus
refuse to acknowledge that their opposition to abortion is
inseparable from an absolute opposition to all forms of “artificial”
contraception. If any implicit or explicit “grand bargain” is to
resolve, on the ground, the United States’ ongoing conflict over
how easily and in what circumstances should legal abortion be
readily available, an ungrudging embrace of maximum possible
contraceptive access is the absolute essential and foundational
building block.

162. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920–22 (2000).
163. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).
164. See David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the
Future of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (2008) (summarizing the
holdings of Casey, Stenberg, and Gonzales); David J. Garrow, A Landmark
Decision, 39 DISSENT 427, 427 (1992) (arguing for the potential that Casey “will
rightfully come to be recognized as one of the most important statements about
individual rights and the judiciary’s role in affording them constitutional
protection issued by the Court in this century”).

